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I. INTRODUCTION
The prosecution of Paul Touvier for crimes against humanity has consumed the
attention of lawyers, scholars, and journalists., In part, this is because many French
people, including judges, have refused to face the truth of Vichy France collaboration with
Hitler's atrocities during the Second World War. The Touvier case, and that of Klaus
Barbie before him, have forced discussion of this issue and now tell a compelling story of
the ways in which French political figures have struggled with the legacy of the German
occupation and the resistance to that occupation. In addition, the opinions of the jurists
in the case give some hint of the stark power of the "crime against humanity" as a
revolutionary concept in international penal law and in the movement to vindicate and
extend international human rights.
The case against Paul Touvier also teaches basic lessons to the legal community in
general, for it illustrates the important maxim that the heart of a criminal case lies in the
details of proof. Touvier's claims-to have been uninvolved, to have acted from good
motives, to have been an honorable soldier-were stripped from him one by one through
the quiet force of facts rather than by rhetoric, prosecutorial excess, or judicial overreaching.
The Touvier case, therefore, is an instructive example in many realms-historical, political
international, and legal-and can teach much to those who will study it.
This Article sets out some basic facts about the Vichy government and Touvier's
involvement therein, continues by outlining the origins and development of the crime
against humanity in international law and as adopted in France, and concludes by dealing
specifically with the Touvier case. The Article is meant to complement the factual and legal
analysis in Claire Finkelstein's Changing Notions of State Agency in International Law: The
Case of Paul Touvier, also in this issue.2
II. VICHY FRANCE: THE BACKGROUND
On May 15, 1940, Germany invaded France? On June 14, 1940, German troops
entered Paris by the Porte de la Villette.4 That night, SS-Obersttlrmfijhrer Helmut
1. See, eg., Ted Morgan, The Hidden Henchman, N.Y. TimS, May 22, 1994, S 6 (Magazine), at 31, to which
we cite below as being among the most accessible discussions of the facts; Catherine Grynfogel, Touvier et lajustice,
une affaire de crime contre rhumanitL, REvu DE sCIENCE CRINMELLE, Jan.-Mar. 1993, at 62; Laurent Greilsamer,
Paul Touvier, un collaborateur dans Histoire-Flic et Devot, LE MONDE, Mar. 17, 1994, Dossier spdcial, at 1; Laurent
Greilsamer, Paul Touvier, un coflaborateur dans 'Histoire-50 ans deprocddur4 LE MONDE, Mar. 17, 1994, Dossier
special, at III [hereinafter Touvier-50 ans de procidure]; Thomas Ferenczi, Un entretien avec lean-Luc Nancy, LE
MONDE, Mar. 29, 1994, at 2.
2. Claire Finkelstein, Changing Notions of State Agency in International Law The Case of Paul Touvier, 30 Tax.
INT'L LJ. 261 (1995). The reader will find some overlap of factual and legal discussion, but we have tried to keep
that to a minimum.
3. SusAN ZucoTTi, THE HOLOCAUST, THE FRENCH, AND THE JEws 37 (1993).
4. PHILIPPE BouRDREL, HisTOIRE DES JUIFS DE FANcE 339 (1974).
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Knochen, the head of the Security Police in France,5 installed himself and his command
at the Hotel du Louvre.6
The French National Assembly met in disorder at Vichy. Under the influence of Vice-
Premier Pierre Laval, the Assembly voted full emergency and constitution-making power
to Premier Henri PhiUipe P6tain, a war hero with the rank of Marshal. Within a few weeks,
Pktain formed a government that promptly made peace with the Germans in exchange for
nominal sovereignty and independence in a part of France. 7
French law soon began to reflect the influence of Nazi Germany. On July 17, the
Vichy government passed its first law regulating the freedom of "foreigners," with major
emphasis on Jews who were not French citizens.8 Five days later, another new law
provided a mechanism for revoking the naturalization of Jews who had obtained French
citizenship after August 1927.9 Certainly, the Vichy government did not automatically and
completely heed the German will of formulating and executing genocidal policies, and some
Vichy ministers were more compliant in this regard than others. At times, members of the
Vichy government attempted to resist German importunities concerning the persecution,
roundup, detention, execution, and deportation of Jews and other groups targeted by the
Nazis. However, Petain's feeble efforts to control some of his ministers resulted in German
counterpressure to which Ptain usually yielded. These efforts became feebler and less
availing, however, after German troops entered Vichy territory in November 1942.10
Laval, whom P~tain had removed from the government in 1940, rejoined the regime under
German pressure.
In January 1943, a new military police detachment-the Milice--was established in the
Vichy zone" under the command of the most virulently pro-Nazi members of the P~tain
cabinet. Reporting directly to Darnand, Secretary of State for the Maintenance of Order,
the Milice was a direct outgrowth of the Service of the Legionnaire Order, or SOL. The
SOL celebrated its goals and functions in a theme song-a sort of "homage to P&ain'-the
last stanza of which is as follows:
SOL, make pure France's lot:
Bolsheviks, freemasons, enemies
Israel, ignoble rot
Nauseated France vomits you out' 2
The Milice came to occupy an increasingly important role in the Vichy government
during 1943 and 1944, right up to the liberation of Paris in August 1944. Its actions
included the July 6, 1944 assassination of Georges Mandel, 13 a cabinet officer under the
5. The Security Police was a subdivision of the Reich Security Division of the Schutzstaffet or SS as it was"
called. This organization is best known, however, as the infamous Gestapo. MICHAEL R. MARRUS & ROBERT 0.
PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE AND THE JEWS 78-79 (1981).
6. DAVID PRYCE-JONES, PARIS IN THE THIRz REICH: A HISTORY OF THE GERMAN OCCUPATION, 1940-1944,
at 43 (1981). See also MAR~us & PAXTON, supra note 5, at 79.
7. See MAPuus & PAXTON, supra note 5, at 11-12.
8. BouRDREL, supra note 4, at 354-55; see also ZucoTTi, supra note 3, at 53.
9. BoURDRL, supra note 4, at 354-55. The commission, headed by Jean-Marie Roussel, began its work
quickly, resulting in further restrictions on Jews. Id. at 355.
10. See PAUL WEBSTER, PATAIN'S CRImEm THE FULL STORY OF FRENCH COLLABORATION IN THE HOLOCAUST
158 (1991) (describing German entry into Vichy in 1942).
11. PRYCE-JONES, supra note 6, at 180-81.
12. BouRDREL, supra note 4, at 504.
13. ZUcoTTI, supra note 3, at 48-49.
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Third Republic and opponent of the Vichy France "reorganization."'14  Mandel's
assassination was, according to the Milice "official version," in retaliation for the killing of
Philippe Henriot, Vichy's virulently pro-Nazi Secretary of State for "information," by the
Resistance on June 28, 1944.15 There was also evidence, however, that Mandel was singled
out for assassination because he was a Jew.16 At Touvier's trial, some of the civil plaintiffs
supported their theory that Touvier's crimes were ordered by the Gestapo by attempting
to show that the Milice had killed Mandel on Hitler's orders. 17
The assassination of Mandel, an eloquent and visible symbol of anti-Vichy and anti-
German sentiment, symbolizes essential truths about the Milice and the Vichy government.
Mandel was killed to avenge the death of Henriot. Henriot's important position within the
Vichy establishment as the war drew to a close evidenced Vichy's alliance with the Reich
and its avowed dedication to anti-Jewish and anti-leftist pogroms. In turn, the Mlics
response to Henriot's death was evidence that it had become "the state," and that it felt free
to apprehend, tr, and punish people without the formality of a trial or even formal
charges. And while Mandel was perhaps the Milicds most prominent target, he was not its
first.
III. TouvIER's ROLE IN VICHY FRANCE18
Among the first targets of Milice violence in the wake of Henriot's death were seven
Jews rounded up and shot in the early hours of June 29, 1944, at a cemetery near the town
of Rillieux-la-Pape.19 This reprisal was conducted under the personal direction of Paul
Touvier, and his role became the sole basis on which he was tried and convicted in
Versailles in the spring of 1994.20 Touvier's common law crime, if one credits the
evidence against him, was a homicide aggravated by theft of the victims' goods.21 Later,
however, when his fugitive days were ended and he finally faced his accusers, he would
claim that his actions at Rilieux-la-Pape had actually saved lives. The Germans, he insisted,
had been so exercised about Henrioes death that they had commanded the assassination
of dozens of Jews.22 Touvier claimed that he had managed to pare the number down to
just seven."3
This claim led to a minute examination not only of Touvier's actions, but of Vichy-
Third Reich relations during this critical period and the Milices role in the closing days of
the war. This factual examination took place against the backdrop of the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal that defined the crime against humanity, the French Penal
Code provisions that codified that offense, and the earlier case of Klaus Barbie, the Gestapo
14. Id.
15. BouRDREL, supra note 4, at 507 & n.1.
16. Id. at 505-07.
17. See ARNO KLARSFELD, TOUVIER, UN CRiME FRAN9AIS 74-75 (1994).
18. Much of this account of Touvier's background and involvement in the executions at Rillleux-la-Pape is
taken from Ted Morgan's The Hidden Henchman; supra note 1.
19. Scott Kraft Collaborator Testifies on Killings of Seven Jews, L.A. TimEs, Mar. 30, 1994, at A7.
20. Id.; see Judgment of Apr. 13, 1992, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1992 Gazette du Palais [G.P.], No. 1, at 387,
392, 400 (Fr.) (dismissing other charges against Touvier for lack of evidence).
21. Morgan, supra note 1, at 33-34 (describing how Touvier looted stores belonging to executed Jews, and then
handed out "gifts" to onlookers to make it appear that neighbors had done the looting). The son of one of the
seven victims testified at Touvier's trial that "[t]he Milice came to my father's store with a moving van and took
everything." Id. at 78.
22. Alan Riding, Frenchman Convicted of Crimes Against the Jews in '44, N.Y. Tims, Apr. 20, 1994, at A3.
23. Morgan, supra note 1, at 32. Touvier invoked the "Schindler defense" in claiming that he saved twenty-
three Jews by getting the number to be killed down from thirty to seven.
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agent known as "the Butcher of Lyon."' Our discussion must begin, however, with the
story of Touvier himself.
In June 1944, twenty-nine year old Touvier was ih command of intelligence for the
Milice over an area in which four million people lived.2 5 Touvier's dignified, almost regal
mien at trial obscured how he had achieved his position of power within the Milice. During
the early Vichy years, he held a clerical job with the railroad and lived with a prostitute
whose husband was in jail. He joined the Milice in October 1943 and quickly achieved a
leadership position.26 He wore fine dothes, drove a car "requisitioned" from a Milice
target, and collected money and belongings from Jews and other targets of Milice hostility.
Touvier concedes that on the afternoon of June 28; he returned to Lyon from Vichy,
some 150 kilometers away, and set in motion the assassination of seven Jews. 27 However,
in his version, upon his return to Lyon he was told by Victor de Bourmont, the Milice chief
for Lyon, that the German Gestapo chief for Lyon, Werner Knab, had demanded the
assassination of one hundred Jews in reprisal for Henriot's death.2s De Bourmont, said
Touvier, had bargained Knab down to thirty.29 Touvier, according to his version, told de
Bourmont that they should start with just seven, and see whether that would be enough.
On Touvier's orders, eight named men were found and arrested, seven of whom were in
fact executed: Glaeser, Schusselman, Zeizig, Ben-Zimra, Prock, Kryzkowski, and one man
whose name has never been established.30 And, as Touvier told it, once the seven were
killed, there were no more requests. 3' At his trial, Touvier could not recall the names of
any of the seven men he ordered killed.32
The primary difficulty with Touvier's version of events is that there is almost nothing
to corroborate his story, even inferentially. Both Werner Knab and Victor de Bourmont,
who could verify Touvier's account, were dead by the time of Touvier's trial. In addition,
hundreds of Jews had been imprisoned in the area, which would have eliminated any need
for Touvier to procure seven more from the streets for execution. Finally, although seven
prisoners were killed, one was spared.3 3 He was Louis Goudard, a Resistance member but
not a Jew.34 Although he was in custody, he was left behind when the group of seven
Jews was taken out of the Lyon Milice headquarters in the Impasse Cathelin.35 He testi-
fied at Touvier's trial that Touvier had selected the seven to be killed and had then made
24. Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321,
1325 (1989).
25. Morgan, supra note 1, at 32.
26. Id. at 37 (describing Touvier's rise to a position of leadership "where he had the power to make arrests
and have people killed").
27. See Marcus Marby, Ripping Through the Veit NEWSWEEK, July 19, 1993, at 29.
28. Riding, supra note 22, at A3.
29. Morgan, supra note 1, at 32 (arguing that "this matter should be settled among Frenchmen").
30. The seven were lined up against the wall of a cemetery outside of town, shot in the back with submachine
gun bursts, and once more in the back of the skull after they fell. The bodies were then lined up and nametags
were affixed to their jackets. According to Pdmond Fayolle, Touvier's aide-de-camp who was nicknamed la puce
(the flea), Touvier said the nametags were "[tlo impress the population." One tag fell off, the lone prisoner who
was spared never knew the name of the victim to whom it had been attached. Id. at 34. The death total could
easily have been nine. One Jew, while being transported to the Impasse Cathelin, convinced his arrestor, a business
associate, that he was not Jewish; he would have been arrested long before if he were. Another Jew arrived at the
Milice headquarters shortly after the van left, carrying the seven who were executed. Id. at 33-34.
31. See id.
32. KLAEsFELD, supra note 50, at 47.
33. Morgan, supra note 1, at 34.
34. Id. at 32.
35. Id. Ordering the execution of only the Jews formed the basis for charging Touvier with crimes against
humanity.
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the decision to leave Goudard behind.36 Indeed, the names of five of the seven men who
were assassinated apparently were derived from a list of names that Touvier had supplied
to the arresting Milice offlcers. 37 The reprisals, then, were to be taken against Jews rather
than against a known Resistance member, despite the fact that the Resistance had
assassinated Henriot.38
That Touvier's account of what happened at Rillieux-la-Pape was untrue is also
reflected in numerous witness statements made by Milice members who said of Touvier:
I did not hear anything concerning this affair... I have only had echoes from
which I remember this: contrary to the orders from Vichy that prohibited all
reprisals for the death of P. Henriot, the regional chief had on his own authority
ordered the execution of ten Israelites at Lyon. 39
From the time that Touvier became a member of the Service, arrests were more
numerous, the chief himself took the decisions . . . The emptying of Ziezig's
store was directed and ordered by Touvier.40
I think this execution is the work of the Milice. On June 28th, 1944, I heard
while I was on duty, information concerning a punitive operation undertaken as
a result of the assassination of P. Henriot... I asked Touvier if I should stay at
Milice headquarters. On his affirmative response, I stayed at Impasse Cathelin,
waiting for further orders. The sun had not risen yet, it was about three o'clock
in the morning, and I was walking on the sidewalk of Impasse Cathelin with
Reynaud, when I saw the soldiers of the Franc-Garde4' coming down the street
with the prisoners. I had seen some of them the night before in the prisons of
the Milice and I recognized among them the Jews that the Service had arrested
several days before. I recognize in the pictures you are showing me the same
faces that I saw then. Under the orders of these soldiers whose names I do not
know, the prisoners were loaded into a closed van that was parked in front of
the Milice garage ... I saw and heard the chief, Touvier giving orders. I heard
36. Goudard's name was read along with the others, and he was taken out of the cell. Touvier saw Goudard
and ordered him returned to his cell. Id. at 34. At Touvier's trial, Judge Henri Boulard interrupted Touvier's
testimony with the following outburst: "Your men went into the big room where you kept your prisoners and told
them to open their flies, and then checked their penises with the barrels of their guns to see if any were
circumcised." Id. at 32.
37. Touvier's secretary, Gilberte Duc, now 75, testified that she recalled hearing Touvier say "Henriot is
avenged-we killed seven Jews," and that Touvier kept a list of Jews to arrest. Id. at 35.
38. Some have speculated that Touvier's motive was one of convenience and not anti-Semitism. The
Resistance was armed and would fight back;, the Jews were unarmed and leaderless. Id. at 35. At his trial, Touvier
denied choosing the seven merely on ethnic grounds. "Being Catholic, I cannot be anti-Semite. We never arrested
a Jew because he was a Jew." Id. at 57.
39. Declaration of Arnaud, witness in the original Touvier trial and a member of the Milice, Lyon, France, Apr.
19, 1946, reprinted in KLARSFaLD, supra note 50, at 50.
40. Interrogatory of Fayolle, witness in the original Touvier trial and a member of the Milice, Lyon, France,
Apr. 11, 1946, reprinted in id at 50-51.
41. The Franc-Garde was a military detachment of the Milice. See Bou wREL, supra note 4, at 503-07.
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him distinctly ask if "the 'boxes' were ready.. ." Touvier left in a private car
... I suppose that Touvier participated in the execution, since I saw him order
the preparations..42
Touvier gave the orders concerning searches [of the victims' property] and
arrests. The fruits of these searches (money, jewels, furniture, etc.) were brought
back to the Milice headquarters where they were seized by Touvier and sold or
exchanged by him. Touvier also ordered many murders, including the execution
of seven Jews at Rillieux (Ain) towards the end of the month of June 1944.
Touvier was an authoritarian man without scruples and a true bandit.43
If there in fact had been a German order, from Knab to de Bourmont to Touvier, then
someone at the time would have heard of it. Yet, as trial counsel pointed out, there was
no trace of any such order. There was, however, evidence that the killings were specifically
directed against Jews, and that they were carried out in a way that matched Touvier's
method of operation. He had admitted personal participation, and the corroborated
evidence of the orders he gave and the actions he took completed the chain of evidence to
convict him of crimes against humanity.
IV. THE CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY
A The August 1945 Charter
The 1945 London Treaty" that established the Nuremberg Tribunal also defined, in
an annexed Charter,4s the crime against humanity. As Ms. Finkelstein notes, the Charter
empowered the Tribunal to "try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the
European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations, committed
any"46 of a number of crimes, including "crimes against humanity."47 The crime against
humanity was defined as "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated." 48
The quoted portions of the Charter actually deal with four separate concepts which
have been mixed up in later discussion. The first idea is the "competence," or jurisdiction,
of the Tribunal in relation to persons: the Tribunal has power only over those persons who
acted in the interest of the Axis powers during a certain time period.49 This power is
42. Interrogatory of Fayolle, witness in the original Touvier trial and a member of the Milice, Lyon, France,
Apr. 19, 1946, reprinted in KLARSFELD, supra note 50, at 51-52.
43. Declaration of Bade], witness in the original Touvier trial and a member of the Millce, Lyon, France, May
15, 1946, reprinted in iti at 50.
44. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug.
8, 1945, 59 Stat 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
45. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug.
8, 1945, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284 [hereinafter
Nuremberg Charter].
46. Id. art 6.
47. Id. art 6(c).
48. Id.
49. M. CHERIp BASSIOUNI, CR mEs AGAINST HumANiTY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 41 (1992).
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termed competence ratione personaeY° A similar definitional exercise can be found in the
U.N. Security Council resolution establishing the international criminal court for trial of
human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia.51
Second, the Charter defines the Tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction, or competence
ratione materiaa52 This competence extends to crimes against humanity, crimes against
the peace, and war crimes.5 3
Third, the Charter provides a definition of specific offenses: 4 This task is obviously
essential given that no international legislative body had passed statutes criminalizing the
potential defendants' conduct. That is, there was no written norm in existence that defined
a "crime against humanity"55 when the Nazis took power in Germany. There were treaty
provisions to which one might refer, but those provisions dealt primarily with war crimes
and to a lesser extent with crimes against the peace.56 The norms described in the Charter
were not, however, drawn from thin air. They could be justified by international consensus
as norms of customary international law, and perhaps as peremptory norms.57 The
drafters of the United Nations resolution on the former Yugoslavia faced a similar task of
definition. That resolution speaks expressly of the principle nullum crimen sine leg4 and
the consequent need to "apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond
any doubt part of customary law."s
Fourth, in defining the crime against humanity, the Charter authorizes prosecution
whether or not the conduct violated the domestic law of the place where it occurred5 9
This principle has since been expanded. For example, the Yugoslavia resolution rejects the
defense of superior orders for subordinates except in mitigation of punishment, and rejects
any defense of official position or compliance with local law on the part of an official.60
There is, of course, extensive literature on these issues in domestic and international
criminal law.6 ' For present purposes, however, it is important to note that the role of
"official action" or "official policy" is defined by these "superior orders" provisions.62
50. The argument that the Charter defines crimes and persons subject to its jurisdiction as separate matters
was made at the Touvier trial by Arno Klarsfeld, attorney for civil parties Association of Sons and Daughters of
Jewish Deportees and certain family members of the victims. See KARsELD, supra note 50, at 94-101.
51. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/827, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203
(1993).
52. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 45, art. 6.
53. See The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 130 (1946). See generally EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OP THE
GERMANS (1972).
54. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 45, art. 6.
55. BASsIOUNI, supra note 49, at 32 n.52.
56. Id. at 24.
57. The distinction between customary international law principles, which are not generally binding on a state
without its consent, and peremptory norms (jus cogens) is discussed in, eg., MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 62-66 (2d ed. 1993); Gordon A. Christenson, The World Court and Jus Cogens 81 Am.
J. INT'L L. 93 (1987); Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector
in International Law, 26 H.Ixv. INe'L L.J. 457 (1985).
58. Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 1.L.M. 1159, 1170 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary General's Report].
59. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 45, art. 6(c).
60. Secretary General's Report, supra note 58, art. 6, 57; id. art. 7, 2-3.
61. See, eg., LYAL S. SUNGA, INDMDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (1992); Thomas W. White, Note, Reliance on Apparent Authority as a Defense to Criminal
Prosecutions, 77 COLuM. L. REv. 775 (1977).
62. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 45, arts. 7-8.
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B. The French Penal Code
In 1964, as the result of agitation led by Holocaust survivors and Resistance groups,
the crime against humanity was added to the French Penal Code and made imprescrip-
tible-that is, not subject to the statute of limitations.63 The 1964 statute did not "create"
the crime as a matter of French law; rather, it simply recognized that "crimes against
humanity" had been created and defined in the United Nations resolution of February 13,
1946 and in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. 64 In fact, since 1810, French law had
provided that torture and barbarity were aggravating circumstances in the commission of
any offense.'i
The offense definition of the 1964 statute was clarified in 1992. Its most pertinent
provisions are as follows:
Article 211-1. Genocide is an action, according to a concerted plan,
directed at the total or partial destruction of a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group, or of any particular group defined according to any other arbitrary
criteria, through commission or causing others to commit, towards the members
of such group, any of the following acts:
- an intentional attempt against human life;
- grave assault against physical or psychic integrity;
- submission to conditions of existence of such a
nature as to cause the total or partial destruction of
the group;
- measures designed to prevent births;
- forced transportation of children.
Genocide is punishable by life imprisonment....
Article 212-1. Deportation, enslavement, or massive and systematic
summary executions, kidnapping of persons followed by their disappearance,
torture or inhuman acts, inspired by political, philosophical, racial or religious
reasons, and organized according to a concerted plan against a group within the
civilian population, are punished by life imprisonment....
Article 212-2. When committed in time of war, according to a concerted
plan, against those who fight the ideological system in the name of which crimes
against humanity are perpetrated, acts included within Article 212-1 are punish-
able by life imprisonment....
Article 212-3. Participation in a group formed or in an association
established in order to prepare for commission of the crimes defined by Articles
211-1, 212-1 and 212-2, when such participation is manifested by commission
of one or more material facts, is punishable by life imprisonment....
63. Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 5 n.20.
64. CODE PANAL [C. P&.] as amended by Law No. 64-1326 of Dec. 26, 1964 (Fr.). Ms. Finkelstein recognizes
that international law is fully binding on French tribunals by virtue of a constitutional "supremacy clause."
Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 266.
65. This provision is currently codified as C. Pgb. art 303. Its historical antecedents are discussed in MICHEL
VARoN, DROIT PANAL SPtCLAL 108-09 (3d ed. 1988).
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Article 213-5. Public action relative to the crimes defined in the present
article, as well as any penalties duly imposed, are not subject to any statute of
limitation.66
Both natural and juridical persons may be prosecuted for these offenses. 67  The
imprescriptibility provision means not only that prosecution is not barred by a statute of
limitations, but also that a judgment of conviction will not lapse if the defendant is a
fugitive. Under French law, most criminal judgments lapse if not carried out within twenty
years. 6
It is important to note that, unlike the Nuremberg Charter, nothing in the text of
these statutes requires proof that the defendant acted on behalf of the state, much less that
he was in the service of an Axis power. In addition, French courts are free to apply the
statutes in accordance with their text, rather than as limited by previous judicial decisions.
C. The Barbie Case: Too Clever by Half
In 1985, four years before Paul Touvier was even arrested, former German citizen
Klaus Barbie was convicted of crimes against humanity in France based on his having
presided over the murder and deportation of Jews and Resistance members.69 The
litigation over these charges provides essential background information to the Touvier case.
Barbie had joined the SS in 1935.70 In 1942, he became head of the Gestapo in Lyon,71
and as such was responsible for repression and reprisals against the Resistance, Com-
munists, and Jews. During Barbie's tenure in the Gestapo, he earned the title "Butcher of
Lyon."72 At the war's end, Barbie became a fugitive.73  After being employed by the
American Counter Intelligence Corps as an anticommunist expert, 74 Barbie later took re-
fuge in Bolivia, where his skills proved useful to a series of rightist governments.75 'Iwo
historic forces came together to bring him to trial in France for crimes against humanity.
First, Franjois ihtterand's government became willing to seek Barbie's return to France so
that he might be investigated and tried. 76 The persistent efforts of groups such as the
Association of Sons and Daughters of Jewish Deportees in France, which was headed by
Serge and Beate Klarsfeld, had gradually worn down resistance to Barbie's prosecution.77
Second, a new Bolivian government was willing to permit Barbie's deportation. 78
66. C. PIf. arts. 211-1, 212-1 to 212-3, & 213-5.
67. See C. PiN. art. 213-1 (listingpenalties for naturalpersons guilty of crimes against humanity); id. art. 213-3
(listing penalties incurred by juridical persons for crimes against humanity).
68. "Punishments pronounced for a crime become barred twenty years from the date on which the judgment
of conviction becomes definitive." C. pNg. art. 133-2.
69. Judgment of Dec. 20, 1985, Cass. crim., 1985 Bull. Crim., No. 407, at 1038 (Fr.).
70. LADISLAS D HoYos, KL.us BARBIE 14 (Nicholas Courtin trans., 1985).
71. AIN FINKELKRAUT, REMEMBERING IN VAIN: THE KLAUS BARIE TRIAL AND CRIMES AGAINST
HumANrry 3 (Roxanne Lapidus & Sima Godfrey trans., 1992).
72. See DE Hoyos, supra note 70, at 11.
73. Nicholas R. Doman, Aftermath of Nuremberg: The Trial of Klaus Barbie, 60 U. CoLO. L. RBv. 449, 450
(1989).
74. Id.
75. See Binder, supra note 24, at 1327.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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In Barbie's case, the examining magistrate79 rejected charges involving members of
the Resistance, because these victims were militarily opposed to the Nazis, and thus were
not noncombatant victims.80 This decision was reviewed and corrected by the court of
appeals, and then by the Cour de cassation, which set the standards under which Barbie was
to be judged. The Cour de cassation decided that the crime against humanity should be
defined in terms of victims and actors: Victims might include not only the direct objects
of systematic racial or religious persecution, but also those who opposed such persecution
by any means. 81 Thus, Resistance members, as soldiers fighting Nazism, also could be
deemed victims of crimes against humanity.8 2
Not every persecutor would be guilty, however. The Cour de cassation stated that the
perpetrator of the crime against humanity should have acted within the framework of his
"affiliation with a state practicing a policy of ideological hegemony" such as the Third
Reich's National Socialist ideology.83 Under this definition, Barbie could be prosecuted
79. This phase-by-phase sketch of the French judicial system in criminal cases may assist the reader in follow-
ing the discussion: The "instruction" is held, after initial police inquiries, under the direction of an examining
magistrate, the juge d'instruction. This magistrate questions the accused and witnesses, and collates all the evidence
to determine whether to send the matter for trial. For more serious offenses, the examining magistrate will send
the case for a second level of instruction to the chamber of accusation of the Cour d'appel before proceeding to
trial in the Cour d'assise. The examining magistrate does not participate in the trial itself, however, since the
functions of instruction and judgment are separate.
There are three criminal courts of first instance, the choice being based on the seriousness of the offense
charged. Minor offenses are tried by a single judge in a Tribunal de police Misdemeanor-type offenses are heard
by three judges in a Tribunal correctioneL Serious crimes are heard by a panel of three professional judges and nine
laypersons (for a total of twelve), constituting the Cour d'assises.
The Cour d'appel is designed to weed out errors of both law and fact, and will reweigh the evidence in cases
coming from the Tribunaux de Police and Tribunaux Correctionels. However, it may not reconsider factual
determinations by a "jury," that is, by the Cour d'assises with its lay members. Legal arguments directed against
a Cour d'assises judgment may be heard by the Cour de cassation.
The Cour de cassation is the supreme court of the ordinary court hierarchy, although the Conseil
constitutionnel has certain powers with respect to the constitutionality of legislation. The Cour de cassation hears
civil and criminal appeals on points of law from the Cour d'appel and (in serious criminal cases) from the Cours
d'assises. As the supreme court, the Cour de cassation has a particular role in ensuring the uniform interpretation
and application of the law throughout France, thereby upholding the constitutional principle of the equality of all
citizens before the law.
Appeals in criminal matters on the ground that the lower court's decision was contrary to law are governed
by Code de procddure pinae, art. 591. Article 593 specifies that a decision will be quashed if it is not reasoned,
or if the reasons are insufficient to enable the Cour de cassation to exercise its control and determine whether or
not the law has been respected.
If the Cour de cassation concludes that the lower court correctly applied the law, it will reject the appeal.
If not, the decision of the lower court will be quashed. However, the Cour de cassation cannot substitute its own
decision for the decision that it has quashed. It therefore usually refers the matter back for reconsideration, not
to the court from which the appeal originated, but to a different court of the same type and level of hierarchy.
When a case is referred down in such a manner, usually in practice to a court of appeal, the latter will retry
the case on both facts and law in respect of the issues raised by the Cour de cassation. Indeed, the parties may even
raise new arguments. It should be noted that the court retrying the case is not bound to apply the interpretation
of the law set out in the decision of the Cour de cassation. This may, of course, lead to a second appeal which will
be heard by the Cour de cassation sitting more formally (plenary meeting). If it again decides to quash the decision
of the lower court on the same grounds as before, the matter will be sent to a third court of equivalent status,
which this time, although still accorded liberty in respect of its appreciation of the facts, is bound to implement
the interpretation of the law as set out by the Cour de cassation.
This brief sketch provides some idea of the procedural complexity involved in interpreting and applying the
relatively controversial legal provisions at issue in the Touvier and Barbie cases.
80. Binder, supra note 24, at 1337.
81. Judgment of Dec. 20, 1985, Cass. crim., 1985 Bull. Crim., No. 407, at 1038, 1053 (Fr.).
82. Binder, supra note 24, at 1337-38.
83. Judgment of Dec. 20, 1985, 1985 Bull. Crim. at 1053.
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because he was a Nazi officer and his victims were opponents of Nazism. Interestingly,
Barbie's defense counsel, the leftist lawyer Jacques Vergbs, had also sought to broaden the
definition of the crime against humanity to one that would theoretically encompass French
colonial atrocities. Vergs had thereby hoped to turn the trial into a demonstration that
France's vaunted adherence to "the rights of man" and humanitarian principles was a
charade.84 The Cour de cassation well understood this goal, however, and its decision was
seen as foreclosing attacks on French colonial misconduct.85 While the language of the
Cour de cassation does not explicitly preclude prosecution of French officials for their
conduct in colonial areas, the major focus is clearly on Barbie as an adherent of Nazi
Germany. Indeed, the prosecutor's theme at Barbie's trial was that Barbie's crimes stemmed
from Nazi ideology.86
With the precise contours of the crime against humanity still unsettled by the Cour
de cassation's 1985 judgment in the Barbie matter, the proceedings against Touvier, which
had been pending in a desultory way, began in earnest.
V. THE TOUVER LITIGATION
A. The Events Surrounding Touvier's Capture and the Pretrial Legal Battle
The same political forces that had demanded the trial of Klaus Barbie agitated for
charges to be brought against Touvier. A formal accusation of crimes against humanity had
been issued against Touvier in 1973, but a team of officers to execute the warrant was not
formed until 1988.87 Touvier had been a fugitive for most of the years since the war. 8
He was finally arrested in May of 1989, at the monastery of a breakaway Catholic sect.89
Among the most telling documents at Touvier's trial were his diaries and scrapbooks,
annotated with his thoughts during his long years in hiding. Arno Klarsfeld,90 one of the
civil advocates at the trial, noted that:
On July 3rd, while Klaus Barbie was listening to the presiding judge Cerdini
pronouncing, in the name of the French nation, the penalty of perpetual impri-
sonment, Paul Touvier, cloistered in an underground life he had deliberately
chosen, was commenting in a green schoolboy's notebook on the torments and
misfortunes of his alter ego of former days.
Not long before that verdict, inspired by a premonition, Paul Touvier wrote
in his notebook this phrase of Ernest Hemingway: "Never ask for whom the
death knell tolls, it tolls always for you." 91
Yes, this phrase of Hemingway was surely a premonition, for two years
later, adjutant Mathy and commandant Recordon tolled the bell of the priory of
84. Binder, supra note 24, at 1337-38.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1339.
87. Morgan, supra note 1, at 56-57.
88. See TED MORGAN, AN UNCERTAIN HOUR: THE FRENCH, THE GERMANS, THE JEWS, THE KLAUS BARBIB
TRIAL, AND THE CITY OF LYON, 1940-1945, at 320-21 (1990).
89. Id.
90. Arno Klarsfeld is the son of Beate and Serge Klarsfeld, activists who had worked tirelessly to secure passage
of legislation on the crime against humanity and to bring alleged offenders to trial.
91. All translations from trial materials are by the authors. We know that the original Hemingway phrasc-in
English-is different. We have left it in a literal translation because Klarsfeld is making a play on words, using in
succession the different French words for carillon bell, doorbell, and death knell.
[Vol. 30:285
PAUL TOUVIER AND THE CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY
Saint-Franjois at Nice, the death knell of Paul Touvier's long escapade, because
of the past that the holy waters of all the monasteries where he had taken refuge
were not able-and would never know how-to purify.92
In September 1944, as the Allied forces entered Lyon, Touvier became a fugitive,
knowing that he was sought for his role in the Milice.93 During this time, he was shel-
tered by Milice friends and sympathetic churchmen. In 1946 and again in 1947, Touvier
was actually declared a fugitive by French tribunals and sentenced to death for treason and
assisting the enemy.94 Under French law, a criminal sentence lapses if it is not carried out
within twenty years,95 and Touvier's sentences thus lost their effect in 1966 and 1967.
Touvier nevertheless remained a fugitive until 1989, even causing a fake report of his death
to be published.96
Although not carried out, the judgments of conviction against Touvier did carry
collateral consequences, such as preventing property ownership. 97 Touvier therefore could
not take title to his dead father's house. But after an intensive lobbying campaign by
Touvier's friends in the church, President Pompidou's staff came to believe Touvier's
version of events and advised Pompidou to accord a pardon, which he did on November
23, 1971.98 And although pardons and amnesties are granted much more frequently in
France than in the United States, it is interesting to note that the only recorded comment
on Touvier made by Pompidou's mentor, Charles DeGaulle, was "Touvier? Twelve bullets
in his hide." 99
DeGaulle's sentiment apparentlywas more widespread than Touvier and his supporters
had imagined. Pompidou's pardon of Touvier therefore had the perhaps unintended effect
of inflaming public opinion and focusing renewed attention on Touvier's case; the
controversy that ensued probably contributed not only to new charges being filed against
Touvier, but also to strengthening the movement to define and punish the crime against
humanity under French law. In June 1972, a leading French newspaper uncovered news
about the pardon and published an article. 100 More publicity followed. Touvier was
charged with crimes against humanitylol as defined in the Charter of London and recog-
nized under French penal law since the addition of the charge to the Code in 1964.102
Appellate procedures in the case dragged on while Touvier remained a fugitive. A
Paris Chambre d'accusation found that the charges against Touvier were legally insufficient
because the state had failed to prove that the accused acted on behalf of a regime dedicated
to racial or religious hegemony; that tribunal refused to hold that Vichy was such a
regime. 103 The Chambre d'accusation judges, it seemed, were unwilling to issue a forth-
92. KLARSPELD, supra note 50, at 46-47.
93. Morgan, supra note 1, at 37.
94. See MORGAN, supra note 88, at 320.
95. C. PN. art. 133-2 (Fr.).
96. Paul Touvier, un collaborateur dan l'Histoire: Chronologig, LB MONDE, Mar. 17, 1994, Dossier special at
in.
97. See C. PANr. art. 213-1(4) (Fr.).
98. Morgan, supra note 1, at 56. See also Scott Kraft, Frenchman on Trial for Crimes Against Humanity, L.A.
TimES, Mar. 18, 1994, at All.
99. Touvier-50 ans de procddure, supra note 1, at 2.
100. See MORGAN, supra note 88, at 320.
101. It.
102. C. PAN. arts. 211-1 to 212-3 (Fr.).
103. Judgment of Apr. 13, 1992, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1992 G.P., No. 1, at 387, 412 (Fr.).
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right denunciation of the Vichy regime, even as it had operated after the Milice had
achieved power and the Germans had abandoned the pretense that Vichy was independent.
Instead, the court apparently accepted one party's argument that the Vichy government was
a "constellation of good intentions."'104
On November 27, 1992, the Cour de cassation quashed the appellate court's deci-
sion.105 However, it also took a narrow view of the crime against humanity, going
beyond the decision that had upheld charges against Barbie to reaffirm judicial approval of
the Vichy government. The judges reasoned as follows:
Whereas [the judges] observe that besides the criminal intent that must
exist to form a common law crime, crimes against humanity must form part of
the execution of a concerted plan, and be accomplished in the name of a State
systematically practicing a policy of ideological hegemony; the crime must also
be committed against people because they belong to a particular racial or
religious group or because they belong to a group that opposes this policy of
ideological hegemony.
Considering that, to determine whether the actions charged against Touvier
formed part of such a concerted plan, the judges, by means of the facts reported
above, analyze the ideology of both the established government of the French
State and that of the Milice, an organization set up by the so-called law of
January 30, 1943; based on a "significant amount of bibliography," they are
drawn to the conclusion that the "Vichy State" did not practice a policy of
ideological hegemony, considering that its policy of collaboration with the
National Socialist State of Germany was essentially pragmatic; that despite the
anti-Semitic measures taken, it "never proclaimed, as did Germany, that the Jew
was the enemy of the State"; that finally, the Milice, which was one of the organs
of the "French State," and did have hegemonic ambitions and had among its
aims the fight "against the Jewish leper for French purity," did not succeed in
transforming the authoritarian State into a totalitarian State;
Whereas, the decision [under review] reports the statements made by
Touvier, who, without denying his participation in the decision to execute the
hostages, has always stated that this decision had been taken jointly with de
Bourmont, then regional chief of the Milice of Lyon, after meeting with Knab,
chief of the local Gestapo, who wanted to organize massive reprisals against the
Jewish population after the assassination of Philippe Henriot; and that de
Bourmont and Touvier had succeeded in reducing the number of victims that
the accused had been ordered to see executed;
Considering, however, in conclusion that while Article 6 of the Statute of
the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg says that the authors or ac-
complices of crimes against humanity are punished only if they have acted for
a State belonging to the European Axis, the Chambre d'accusation could not,
without contradicting itself, declare that the assassinations in this case were not
a crime against humanity, while at the same time pointing out that they were
104. Id.
105. Judgment of Nov. 27, 1992, Cass. crim., 1992 Bull. Crim., No. 394, at 1082, 1116 (Fr.).
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committed at the instigation of a leader of the Gestapo, an organization declared
criminal because it acted for a State that practiced a policy of hegemonic ideo-
logy. .. 106
The Cour de cassation remanded the parties to the Chambre d'accusation of the Cour d'appel
of Versailles, which then formulated the charges Touvier faced at trial in the Cour d'assises
in Versailles.107
B. Touvier's Day in Court
Touvier's trial was an extraordinary spectacle. Touvier was confronted not only by
the public prosecutor, but also by thirty-four civil lawyers, representing victims and victim
groups. And while this unification of civil and criminal liability in the same trial is the
norm in France, 108 the sheer number of such parties civiles is unusual.
The exceptional nature of these proceedings is striking indeed; to best recapture their
spirit, therefore, we have translated portions of the courtroom testimony and summation
eloquently delivered by Arno Klarsfeld. These excerpts will provide pertinent factual
background in addition to illuminating the fascinating historical event that Touvier's trial
became.
As noted previously, Touvier never denied his part in the killings, but he added to his
claim that he had actually spared lives:
"The dead of Rillieux were not simply hostages chosen among the population
because theywere Israelite, but because of their 'anti-national activities,' in accor-
dance with the laws of that time... It is even more scandalous to accuse me,
considering that I did everything I could to save human lives, and in doing so
took very grave risks."
"I insist on reiterating that a hunt against Jews was never unleashed after
the assassination of Philippe Henriot. Moreover, I recall that the dossier
establishes that some of the Jewish victims had already been arrested several days
before."109
In the sequence that follows, Klarsfeld recounts what he deems to be the absurdity of
Touvier's assertion that he had saved lives on that now infamous day in 1944:
But even admitting that [Touvier] had chosen deliberately to omit to tell
others of his "tragic combat" (these are his words) directed at diminishing the
number of victims: do you sincerely think, members of the jury, that it could
be possible that the agitation, the confusion, the number of comings and goings
between his office and that of de Bourmont, that all of this stirring that he
described in his interrogatories, could have passed unseen by the Milice at the
Impasse Cathelin? Do you believe that if there had been an order from the
Germans these Milice members would have known absolutely nothing about it?
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See ANDREW WEST ET AL, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 229 (1992).
109. Touvier, quoted in KLAESFELD, supra note 50, at 77-78.
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That passes the limits of understanding.
How in the world can one believe in such blindness among the Milics
Second Service: the information service of the Milice!
Of information!!
These Milice members were supposed to be the source of information of the
Vichy regime. These Milice members were supposed to be on alert, on the look-
out for the least bit of information. Would they have let such an important item
of information get by?
But perhaps Touvier tried to keep this information secret, not from
modesty, but for another reason? His defense counsel will certainly not fail to
make such a claim. But when he does, ask yourself why? Why would Touvier
want to keep such information secret? Then ask yourselves: is that plausible?
Close your eyes, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. You are in the summer
of 1944, not far from the place where the Sa6ne and the Rh6ne come together.
You are at Impasse Cathelin, at the comer of St. HlThne street, quite near to the
Perrache train station [Lyon's main train terminal]. Touvier goes to see his
second in command Reynaud and says: "We need seven Jews."
You heard him, as he repeated this phrase fifty years later, here, in this
proceeding, in front of you.
Under these conditions, what would Reynaud's normal answer be?
"Seven Jews, but what for, Paul?"
This is the question that Reynaud or other Milice members, facing Paul
Touvier's request must have asked.
But now, supposing that there really had been a German demand, ask
yourself whether Touvier could have answered: "Take care of it, Reynaud, I
need seven Jews to execute. Go, run, hurry and bring back seven Jews!"
How is it that Paul Touvier could possibly have responded in such terms,
he so attentive to his image, he who changed suits several times a day, a
substitute for not being able to change his conscience. (And you recall what a
suit cost at that time, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. You recall the testimony
of M. Jeanblanc who told you the shock he felt when he saw his own suit on a
Milice member who had stolen it from him during what Touvier called,
according to the hearings, a "loan" or a "search." At that time, M. Jeanblanc
told you that it was necessary to save for more than a year in order to afford a
suit.)
And so, why would someone like Paul Touvier, so concerned about his
image, have let it be degraded by failing to respond to Reynaud, in case there had
really been a German demand:
"No, these seven unfortunate Jews, I need them in order to
save ninety-three of their brethren!"
Oh yes, if there had been a German demand, then Touvier would not have
failed to answer in such a way as to justify his order [to Reynaud] and to not
look like an assassin in others' eyes.
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And if he had answered in such a way, the Milice members interrogated
after the war would not have failed to give this information to the instructing
judges who interrogated them about the massacre of Rillieux, so as to attenuate
their own responsibility."0
Klarsfeld went on to attack Touvier's story by comparing Touvier's actions at the time
with his later writings and the historical facts surrounding the incident:
Because as you very well know, it is less serious to kill seven Jews when you
have been asked for a hundred, than to kill seven when you have been asked for
none.
But the problem is that Touvier did not say: "Reynaud, go and request the
presence of seven unfortunate Jews here at the Impasse Cathelin."No!
No!
He said: "Reynaud, go and find me seven bits of Jew garbage." This is how
Touvier knows so well to describe them in his writings after the war.
That is what has been said. Because there never was the slightest order or
even the slightest demand from the Germans.
But have I not left out here another demonstrative? Would he not have
said: "Go and find me these seven pieces of Jew garbage," linking action to
words by holding out for Reynaud or somebody else a list of names of Jews to
be arrested?
Certainly. Otherwise, how can one explain the long time-almost ten
hours-that was necessary to find seven Jews in a city where dwelt at least fifteen
thousand? In fact, it was not seven, but five Jews that were necessary, because
two Jews were already in the jail at Impasse Cathelin.
What, ten hours for five indeterminate Jews? That's indeed slow for a
Milice member as skilled as Paul Touvier. It's indeed slow for a service that had
a card file of Jews!
But all this can easily be explained if these were particular Jews for whom
they were searching.
In fact, just like at Macon there was a list. But while at Macon the names
mentioned on the list were there by virtue of their sympathy with the Resistance,
Paul Touvier had made out the list at Rillieux because they were born Jews.
The birth certificates of these seven Jews were also their death
certificates."n
The version of events supported by this argument also was corroborated by the
testimony of Max Roxencwaig, a Jewish barber who was arrested at about 3:00 a.m. on June
29; Roxencwaig did not arrive at the Impasse Cathelin until about fifteen minutes after the
truck carrying the other seven had left, and was therefore spared." 2
Klarsfeld's argument resumes by citing additional support for the proposition that
Touvier's motives were anything but humanitarian in nature:
110. Id. at 55-58.
111. Id. at 58-60.
112. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 34.
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Because they were Jews, of course, but also because Paul Touvier knew that
he could achieve pecuniary gain. A gain for the Milic4 but also for himself. To
the crime against humanity is added the common law crime. That, for sure, is
barred by the statute of limitations, Jacques Tr~molet!
There were other reactions from the Milice members, perhaps less guarded
than those they admitted to in their postwar interrogations. These were
provided to us by M. Goudard, on April 6. The reactions followed the news of
Philippe Henriot's death: "Bastards!" they said, addressing the six people already
in the jail cell. "You are all going to die!" This did not surprise Louis Goudard
who already had let slip a "we're all screwed" when he heard of Henriot's death.
This "we're all screwed" referred to the reprisals conducted by the Milic4 not
those conducted by the Gestapo. n 3
This assertion is supported by a 1970 government report authored by investigator Jacques
Delarue that documented Touvier's actions:" 4
On June 28, the death of Philippe Henriot-struck down by the Resistance-
having been announced, Touvier decided to avenge his death by instituting a set
of reprisals. A "Jew hunt" was immediately undertaken by the Second Service;
this involved rounding up seven shopkeepers who had not already been arrested.
On the 29th of June at daybreak, they were brought to Rillieux (a suburb of
Lyon), lined up along the wall of the cemetery and struck down. During the
course of that day, their stores were completely pillaged.11 5
Delarue later took inconsistent positions in various judicial proceedings, however, at one
time testifying that "[the Germans could not have cared less about Philippe Henriot at that
time, because they had other preoccupations," and at another time maintaining that the
Rillieux assassinations were the result of a German initiative." 6
Touvier's claims were further undermined by the fact that Gestapo chief Knab's
supposed vehemence to avenge the death of Henriot was not reflected in any contemporary
documents, including a detailed report of a dinner hosted by Knab on the evening of
Henriot's death." 7 Arno Klarsfeld noted this point in his summation:
Ah yes, in this report there is not a single word about the death of Philippe
Henriot. How is it that someone like Knab, who several hours before reportedly
wanted to massacre one hundred Jews by way of reprisals after the death of
Philippe Henriot, had by that same night forgotten everything?
The theme of this dinner and its raison d'8tre were above all the political
situation in France.
Moreover, in the Knab dossier, which my opponent knows very well, having
devoted many mornings to it, there is a telegram in which Knab informs Oberg,
the chief of SIPO-SD in France, his irritation that Henriot had not submitted to
the Germans the text of a speech made after the attack at the Glires plateau.
This same Oberg, interrogated in 1946 concerning Henriot, affirmed: "I met
113. KLARSFELD, supra note 50, at 60-61. Jacques Tr~molet de Villers was Touvier's lawyer.
114. ld. at 65.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 66-67.
117. See id. at 70-71.
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Philippe Henriot at the German embassy where he was present at a reception
following his return from the Reich. I saw him again once or twice in various
public gatherings, notably some time before his death. I never had any sort of
dealings with him, he never visited my home, and I never visited his."
It appears from these documents that Knab, chief of the SIPO-SD of Lyon,
not only failed to evoke the name of Philippe Henriot the same day of his
execution when the dinner discussion centered on the situation in France, but
that in addition [Henriot] had irritated him by not submitting the text of his
speech to the occupying power.
As for Oberg, Knab's superior, he treated Henriot with indifference. As a
crime of passion, this court of assizes has already seen better! 81
Klarsfeld also documented, by contrast, the Milice reaction to Henriot's death, further
bolstering the claim that Touvier and his Milice associates were prime movers in the
reprisals:
We set the scene with the help of a report from the Commissioner of the
Interior:
"Black tapestries were hanging in the hall of the
ProgrS119 [the new headquarters of the information service
of the Milice in Lyon] in memory of Philippe Henriot; a
coffin, a flame, guarded by Milice members, stood at the
center. Men who had forgotten to remove their hats, or who
perhaps were observed to have a slight smile in seeing all of
this, were forced by the Milice members to remain for hours
on their knees in front of the coffin (and certain of them were
required to hold their hands behind their backs)."120
Francis Bout de lAn wrote in the Milice journal, Combats.1.2
"The Milice member Philippe Henriot is dead and it is
our responsibility to safeguard his memory, to strike at those
who, from nearby or far, prepared the crime. I know that he
did not like bloodshed, I know that he did not like to see us
multiply vengeance or reprisals, but I know also that he would
not understand a curiously indulgent society only giving a few
years imprisonment to such criminals."122
Indeed, the reprisal execution of Georges Mandel seems independently attributable to
the Milic4 and not the Germans. There is evidence that even senior Vichy government
officials thought that the Milice had gotten out of hand in killing Mandel.123 Similarly,
it now seems clear that Touvier-via the Milice vehicle-also acted independently in
ordering the assassination of the seven men at Rillieux-la-Pape on June 29, 1944. His
actions, whatever their motivation, did not mitigate the violence that day. Rather, Paul
Touvier was the primary instigator of that violence.
118. Id. at 71-72.
119. Progras is a local newspaper still existing in the northeast part of France.
120. KLAIZSPBLD, supra note 50, at 72-73.
121. Combats was the principal newspaper under the Vichy regime.
122. Id. at 73.
123. See MoRGAN, supra note 88, at 290-92.
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VI. LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE STATE AGENCY DILEMMA
Two fundamental questions emerged from the evidence presented at Touvier's trial:
First, who gave the initial order for the killings? Second, in June 1944, was there sufficient
relationship between Touvier's actions and some government to satisfy any state actor
requirement that might be found to exist? In examining the first question, it seems clear
that there was no German order of the kind Touvier described. Thus, Touvier's claim that
he had saved lives by some grim utilitarian calculus could not be sustained. Even if the
existence of a German order had been proved, the presiding judge expressed skepticism at
such a claim, asking why Touvier could not have either sought help from the Vichy
government itself or simply refused to carry out the orders.'" In any event, a defense
of superior orders is not even available in crimes against humanity prosecutions, although
it may be considered in mitigation of punishment.125
The second question was more difficult to answer and requires detailed examination.
When one parses the text of the London Charter by subject matter, it seems clear that the
crime against humanity does not require that the actor have been an agent of state power;
he or she need simply have intentionally 2 6 committed the proscribed act with the pro-
scribed motivation or effect. The majority of the prohibited acts can most readily be
committed by those possessing state power. However, such inhumanities have been
committed, and are being committed, by members of nominally private groups as well. 12 7
The limitation in the London Charter to agents of Axis powers defined the
competence or jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal, not the elements of offenses it was
to try.128 Thus, unlike Ms. Finkelstein, we do not find a "state agency" requirement in
the text of the London Charter. We recognize that, as illustrated by the Barbie and Touvier
cases, the French courts have persisted in finding such a requirement; however, French
judicial opinions are not binding precedent even in France, where judges are free to
interpret statutes according to their text and evident purpose rather than in accordance with
prior judicial interpretation.129
Many writers have remarked that a state actor requirement exists for some or all
crimes under international law, but such assertions rest upon the idea cited by Ms.
Finkelstein that "international law governs relations among states, rather than among
individuals." 3 It would perhaps be more precise to say that traditionally, nations rather
124. Morgan, supra note 1, at 32.
125. C. PtAN. art. 213-4 (Fr.).
126. The intent requirement should be interpolated to save the provision at issue from an attack on grounds
of vagueness and to ensure that persons who were not aware of these nonstatutory norms are not punished. See
generally Michael B. Tigar, "Willfulness" and "Ignorance" in Federal Criminal Law, 37 CLuv. ST. L. REv. 525 (1989)
(discussing this principle in the context of domestic law).
127. Examples would include Afrikaner groups in South Africa seeking to destabilize the existing government,
Ku Klux Klan and Nazi groups in the United States, death squads in El Salvador and Guatemala, and similar
entities in other parts of the world.
128. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 45, art. 6. In fact; this article falls under title II of the Charter, entitled
"Jurisdiction and General Principles."
129. WEST ET AT., supra note 108, at 57.
130. See Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 270. It is true that such eminent authorities as M. CherifBassiouni have
argued that the concept of state action should be maintained as an ingredient of crimes against humanity;
Bassiouni, however, does not give a systematic reason why this particular international crime should develop along
different lines than international penal law generally, which focuses increasingly on individual responsibility. See
BAssIouNqI, supra note 49, ch. 6, reviewed by Benjamin B. Ferencz in 88 Am. J. INT'L L. 204 (1994). Cf. SUNGA,
supra note 61.
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than individuals were regarded as the bearers of rights and obligations under international
law.' 3'
It is necessary, however, to define exactly what is meant by "traditional." An even
older view of humanitarian international law recognized that individuals possessed rights
that all national sovereigns were bound to respect.132 The contrary view may be traced
to the late 18th century, coinciding with Jeremy Bentham's coining of the word "inter-
national."133
Whatever may have been traditional prior to World War II, in the period since, there
has been an increasing recognition that individuals have rights and obligations under
international law.134 The "rights" side of this picture is the clearer of the two, for the
recognition of crimes against humanity, and of "international human rights," presupposes
that individuals are direct beneficiaries of legal rules. But many have also recognized that
individuals may have obligations under international law.'3 s Such a view is implicit in
the rejection of the defense of superior orders, for this rejection posits a duty that does not
arise from national citizenship or allegiance, but rather is found on a higher, international
or metanational plane.
The concept of individual obligation under international law is not entirely new. The
Soviet scholar G.I. Tunkin has spoken of "responsibility of individuals for crimes against
humanity."lM6 As Ms. Finkelstein recognizes, piracy has long been known as an in-
dividual crime against the law of nations.137 Engaging in the slave trade might also fall
into the same category.'38
The Genocide Convention expressly mandates punishment of "private individuals"
who violate its terms. 139 The United States has responded to its obligations under the
Convention by enacting 18 U.S.C. S 1091, making genocide a crime. The statutory
definition requires that the offense be committed in the United States by an American
national, but contains no requirement that the defendant have acted on behalf of a
government. 140 Thus, while to date the prosecution of crimes against humanity has fo-
cused on state actors, there seems no reason that they should be the only ones susceptible
of being charged with such offenses. 141
131. THOMAS BUSRGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HuMA RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 2-3 (1988).
132. This was the view of Grotius, for example, who thought that innate human characteristics and
fundamental values about human development had a superior claim to our adherence than positive laws that had
no basis in history or enlightened social thought. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 13 (Francis
W. Kelsey trans., 1925).
133. Bentham's work is usually taken as marking the beginning of a "positivist approach" to international law.
See JANis, supra note 57, at 227-35.
134. Id.at250. Se also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW INA NUTSHELL 116-27 (1990).
135. SUNGA, supra note 61, at 34-35.
136. GRIGoRI I. TuNiN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 244 (William E. Butler trans., 1974) (1970). At
another point he speaks of "the criminal responsibility of physical persons" for such crimes. Id. at 412.
137. Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 262. See also 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 23 (M. CherifBassiouni ed.,
1986).
138. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 137, at 21-22.
139. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. IV, 78
U.N.T.S. 277; see BAssIOlNI, supra note 49, at 224-25 (quoting the Genocide Convention).
140. 18 U.S.C. S 1091(d)(1)-(2) (1988).
141. Americans may be accustomed to thinking of crimes against humanity as a broader version of criminal
violations of civil rights under the federal criminal laws. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (construing 18 U.S.C. SS 241-242). Such offenses under United States case
law require that the accused be, or be in concert with, a state actor. This requirement springs from the notion that
constitutional rights are valid against "state" and not "private' action. See, &g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
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Limiting criminal responsibility to state actors might cause difficulty in a time of frag-
mented public authority and genuine dispute over who is exercising state power in fact and
in law. The state actor inquiry in the Touvier case illustrates this problem. The Milice
surely was an agent of the Vichy government, yet Milice members had loyalties to the Nazis
that surpassed those of many Vichy officials, as well as aspirations for their own future role
in a reconstituted Europe.142 The same sort of ideology dominates a number of the most
violent groups whose actions implicate the interests protected by the prohibition on crimes
against humanity. Examples include death squads, disappearance squads, and other sorts
of paramilitary groups that exist on the fringes of formal state power.
Therefore, the correct answer to the state actor inquiry in Touvier's case was that the
political ideology and military organization of the Milice made the crimes committed by its
organized force sufficiently different from ordinary homicide to constitute crimes against
humanity. However, the tribunal was operating under a requirement that it find some
more formal link to Nazi Germany. In this respect, the judgment of the Cour de cassation
was controversial, although it no doubt prompted relief among those who wished to
preserve a certain image of the Vichy government, as well as among those who did not wish
to see the crime against humanity expanded in ways that could lead to prosecutions of
French officials for their conduct in France's colonial wars. But however a future court may
interpret the statute, Touvier could not be convicted at his trial without proof that he was
a Nazi accomplice.
Here, then, was a puzzle. The Cour de cassation had said that the Vichy government
was not itself an arm of the Axis powers; therefore, Touvier could not be guilty solely by
virtue of this elevated position within the Vichy police hierarchy. Furthermore, he could
not be guilty based on an order from the Nazi Knab if there were no such order.
There was a third possibility, however: Touvier could be guilty of crimes against
humanity if he carried out his plan in order to serve the Nazi interest and to forestall the
impending Nazi collapse. Under familiar principles of criminal law, one can be an
accomplice without prior agreement.143  In systems that punish conspiracy, the crime
consists essentially of an agreement to commit an offense. If an offense is actually
committed, it is by prearrangement.'" However, one may become an accomplice to
crime by a voluntary action to aid the principal offender without the command or even the
consent of the principal.145 For example, if A sees B in the act of robbing X, and helps
out in the hope or expectation of gaining part of the loot, A is B's accomplice regardless
of whether B agrees to A's participation. It is even possible to imagine a scenario in which
B is unaware of A's help, as where A keeps a lookout for any approaching police and is
ready to sound the alarm, provided, of course, that A has the proscribed intent.146
Touvier was convicted on the theory that he was in fact aiding Nazi German interests
by his crime, and intended to do so.'4 7 Whatever marginal moderation that Vichy had
shown in carrying out Nazi wishes, Touvier in particular and the Milice in general were
fully imbued with Nazi ideology.
U.S. 163 (1972).
142. MARRUs & PA xToN, supra note 5, at 335.
143. -g., jOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW S 30.08 (1987).
144. See id. S 29.04.
145. Id. S 30.08.
146. See id.
147. Judgment of Nov. 27, 1992, Cass. crim., 1992 BuU. Crim., No. 394, at 1082 (Fr.).
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Advocates at the trial traced the Milice's increasing influence over the Vichy
government. The excerpt that follows describes this influence with arresting clarity:
The complicity of the Milice with the Gestapo in the concerted plan called
the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question' is obvious.
When, under cover of German pressure on the Vichy government, as
recalled by all the historians who gave evidence before you, Joseph Darnand
seized the levers of power of the state police by becoming Secretary General of
the Maintien de l'Ordre48 [paramilitary police organization], Jews of French
nationality were sheltered from massive police arrests. Bousquet, Laval and
Pdtain had loaned the French police to the Germans in order to arrest Jewish
aliens and their children; but they had refused to turn over French Jews.
On November 20, 1943, Colonel Knochen wrote to Bousquet:
"The security police and the SD at Limoges asked to
examine the list of Israelites established by the city's regional
prefect. He refused to cooperate with the Police Chief's
demand. He justified this refusal by declaring that, according
to information given to him by the competent French
authorities, the German authorities could only look at the list
of foreigners, and not the list of French Israelites, in confor-
mity with an agreement concluded between the General
Secretary of the French Police and the Commander in Chief
of the SS and the German police."
On November 22, Bousquet responded to Colonel Knochen:
"On November 12, 1943, I did indeed receive a com-
munication from the regional prefect of Limoges telling me
that the regional Chief of the Security Police-SD had asked
him for authorization to check the lists set up by the prefec-
tures concerning the Israelites. I indicated to him that it
would be impossible to satisfy that demand. Again recently,
the same demand had been presented at the request of the
German authorities to the chief of government by the General
Commissioner on the Jewish Question, and I had to em-
phasize once again the point of view of my administration,
which has been formally approved by the French government.
"As far as the French police and administration are
concerned, the fact of being an Israelite does not constitute a
presumption of liability, either in a political sense or as a
matter of law. This fact cannot even constitute an aggravation
of such liability if a Jew is prosecuted for a crime or tort pun-
ished by our penal legislation. Moreover, the German laws are
applicable only in the occupied zone.
"Consequently, the attitude of the French administration
cannot be different than it is and there can be no question of
modifying the instructions that I have given in order to assure
compliance with our legislation. I am sure that you will have
148. The Maintien de 1'Ordre (MO) was a paramilitary police organization.
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the good grace to transmit to your services all instructions that
may be necessary to avoid similar requests to the French
authorities who can do nothing but refuse to honor them."
On December 4, 1943, Hitler demanded of Marshal P~tain that "Laval be
ordered to reorganize without delay the French cabinet in a manner acceptable
to the German government such that collaboration is guaranteed. This cabinet
shall enjoy the complete support of the Head of State."
This is how Darnand and Henriot came to enter Vichy government.
On January 10, 1944, when the Bordeaux Gestapo demanded that the
Prefecture of Bordeaux begin the arrest of French Jews in the region, the regional
prefect responded "Without some contrary indication from the Vichy
government, the operation could only be executed by the German police itself."
The Bordeaux Gestapo then alleged that Darnand had already given his
approval to the operation; the Prefect declared that "he would stick to the
decision taken by the head of the government." At the end of the evening,
Darnand called the Prefect on Laval's behalf, and informed him "that it is
advisable not to delay any longer the execution of this operation."
The operation took place during the night and brought to Drancy, and then
to Auschwitz, more than two hundred Jews of the Bordeaux region.
July 2, 1942 had marked the abandonment by Bousquet and Vichy of the
foreign Jews, arrested from then on by the French police; January 10, 1944 marks
the abandonment by Darnand and Vichy of the French Jews, arrested thereafter
en masse either by the Vichy police, or by the Gestapo, thanks to lists from the
prefectures and indications furnished by the Milic&
On January 25, 1944, the General Director of the National Police informed
Milice member Knipping, who had become the north zone delegate to the
General Secretary of the MO, that "by a note of the 20th of November 1943, that
has just come to my attention [this was a reference to the Knochen note that I
already cited and to which Bousquet had replied by the negative, which response
I have also mentioned], the commandant of the Security Police and of the SD
has just demanded that I give instructions to the Prefects in the southern zone
allowing the German police services to have access to information at the
headquarters of each prefecture in order to know the names of French and alien
Israelites. I have the honor to let you know that I have just sent instructions to
all of the regional Prefects."
Therefore, by the intervention of Darnand, the Germans obtained what they
sought, which even Bousquet had refused to give them.
The seizure of control of the State Police by the Chief of the Milice and his
crew opened a new phase of persecution: First and in particular, the massive
arrest of Jews of French nationality by the French police forces conducted by
Darnand for the benefit of the Germans; and second, the participation of the
Milice in the summary execution of Jews.
Up to that point, Vichy had always caused or left the Jews interned in the
camps of the free zone, such as those at Gurs, No6 or Rivesaltes to die by phy-
sical misery. Up to that point, Vichy had delivered Jewish Resistance members
to the Germans as hostages that the Germans executed by firing squad. But up
to that time Vichy had not gone as far as the summary execution of Jews.
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This was the work of the Milic4 an organ which, we must recall, was
created and promoted by the Germans in 1944, the iron lance of the police
forces of Vichy, forged to strengthen the defenses of this collaborationist
government that it served so well.
The Gestapo wanted the arrest of a large number of French Jews. The
Vichy of the Milic4 the Vichy of 1944, agreed to accomplish that which the
Vichy of 1942 and of 1943 had refused.
In 1944, notably after the Normandy invasion, the Gestapo, impelled by
rage, fear, and hatred, began the summary execution of Jews and Resistance
members. The Milic4 its accomplice, servilely followed its example.
Like their chief, Joseph Darnand, all the Milice members were united by
oath to Hitler and in their heart were wearing German uniforms: they were
indeed perceived as such by their compatriots, who saw in them French Hitlerites
totally aligned with Nazi ideology.
A French Hitlerite: that is what Touvier was when he brought about the
massacre of seven Jews at Riflieux-la-Pape.149
Turning to Touvier individually, his efforts to portray himself as motivated by a desire
to see the law respected, and his denial of anti-Semitic animus, failed for want of evidence.
Touvier had kept a diary during his years of exile which contained more than his
sympathetic regard for Barbie's fate in Lyon. In that diary, Touvier referred to a French
female newscaster and her interview subject as "Jewish garbage," the old Milice slogan.150
A French intellectual was called a "[d]readful Jewish shopkeeper."''5 Mengele, on the
other hand, was "a victim of hatred."152 Touvier's diaries contained many other similar
remarks.
Touvier was thus revealed as part of a group within the Milice that so fervently
supported the Reich's goals of racial purity that he required no specific German order to
carry out the murder of the seven Jews at Rillieux-la-Pape. He was the good Nazi servant,
doing deeds in the hope that he might stem the Allied tide and be recognized in the
postwar Reich for his works. While his offense was the crime against humanity, his legal
responsibility rested upon settled principles of ordinary criminal law. Touvier was
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Touvier was probably the last of the World War II Nazi henchmen to be tried. The
others are dead or in hiding.15 3 The Touvier and Barbie trials were designed by French
authorities to teach and to provoke memories of the Holocaust;154 how well they
succeeded is debatable. Guyora Binder has eloquently doubted the wisdom of any group
defining itself in opposition to some extreme ideology even when the ideologues are bent
on the group's destruction.155
149. KLARSFELD, supra note 50, at 103-09.
150. Morgan, supra note 1, at 57, 78.
151. Id. at 57.
152. Mengele was the Auschwitz doctor who conducted medical experiments on prisoners. Id. at 78.
153. See Riding, supra note 22, at A3.
154. See Marby, supra note 27, at 29.
155. See generally Binder, supra note 24.
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Whether or not one agrees with that argument, the crime against humanity has existed
for decades as an abstract concept. Enslavement and piracy which can be regarded as
examples of crimes against humanity, have been recognized for centuries. However, it is
one thing to define a crime and another to dignify the definition by concrete action. There
may be many homicides, but a system of criminal justice that punishes murder does not
emerge until some assassins are caught and tried. Likewise, the concept of crime against
humanity could not take shape until Nuremberg. In that context, and for all the war
crimes prosecutions since then, international criminal law was dedicated to ensuring not
only that guilty persons were punished, but that the criminals and their accomplices were
denied an opportunity to rewrite history by denying their crimes.
The discord over Touvier's case-and to a lesser extent over Barbie's-in many ways
focuses on a potential change in the use of international penal law. An expansive definition
of the crime against humanity gives the offense contemporary relevance. The elements of
the offense can become criteria for judging the present-day actions of power-wielders. Even
those who are not now targets of such scrutiny may well recoil at this advance in the law.
In Touvier's case, the potential for judging contemporary events was compounded by the
possibility that millions of French people who had lived under the Vichy regime would be
branded as collaborators with the Nazis.
The Touvier trial, and the debate over the crime against humanity, indicates something
important about the role of the lawyer. As lawyers, we are in charge of remembering, but
for different purposes than victims remember. For lawyers are to remember so that we can
make constructive change in the future. Specifically, we should view the atrocities com-
mitted in World War II in a critical context, so that we can devise and apply principles of
international law to restrain such actions in the future, and to punish the individuals who
violate those principles. This has, indeed, been the task of postwar human rights activism.
The Touvier litigation is valuable because it shows the ways in which the human rights
movement is both fragile and powerful. It was powerful in compelling the bringing of
charges. It was fragile because conservative French jurists saw clearly that a broad definition
of the crime against humanity would implicate a new generation of French colonial military
officers. These jurists responded in the Barbie case by narrowing the definition of the crime
against humanity, and that theme was sounded again in the Touvier case.
In addition, these conservative judges were anxious to portray the Vichy government,
which so many still in public life had served in one way or another, as more victim than
wrongdoer. That part of French civil society represented by the French judges was no more
ready to confront a disgraceful past than are some judges and lawyers in the United States
when faced with the history of racism in this country.
The sense of public officials that human rights principles can strike too close to home
has repeatedly been a major obstacle to progress in strengthening human rights institutions.
All too often, such officials merely pay lip service to ideals to which they have no real
commitment, even if that commitment is in fact "formalized" through the ratification of
a treaty or convention. It is evident that the crimes against humanity committed against
the backdrop of World War II did not end with that war: Witness the decimation of
hundreds of thousands of Mayan Indians in Guatemala, the annihilation of the Kurds in
Iraq and elsewhere, and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. The most important
lesson of the Touvier case is not, therefore, that one must remember the Holocaust as an
event to be avenged, but rather that one must continue to be vigilant today.
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